Dynamic FPGA Detection and Protection of Hardware Trojan: A Comparative
  Analysis by Alanwar, Amr et al.
  
 
International Journal of Computing and Digital Systems 
ISSN (2210-142X)  
Int. J. Com. Dig. Sys. 5, No.3 (May-2016) 
 
 
E-mail address: {amr.alanwar, mona_alaa, yousra.alkabani, watheq.elkarashi, hassan.bedour}@eng.asu.edu.eg 
  http://journals.uob.edu.bh 
 
Dynamic FPGA Detection and Protection of Hardware 
Trojan: A Comparative Analysis 
 
Amr Alanwar
1,2
, Mona A. Aboelnaga
1
, Yousra Alkabani
1,3
, M. Watheq El-Kharashi
1,4*
 and Hassan Bedour
1
 
 
1Computer and Systems Engineering Department, Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt 
2Electrical Engineering Department, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, USA 
3Computer Science and Engineering Department, American University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt 
4Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, University of Victoria, Victoria, Canada 
 
Received 18 Jan. 2016, Revised 12 Mar. 2016, Accepted 1 Apr. 2016, Published 1  May 2016 
Abstract: Hardware Trojan detection and protection is becoming more crucial as more untrusted third parties manufacture many 
parts of critical systems nowadays. The most common way to detect hardware Trojans is comparing the untrusted design with a 
golden (trusted) one. However, third party intellectual properties (IPs) are black boxes with no golden IPs to trust. So, previous 
attempts to detect hardware Trojans will not work with third party IPs. In this work, we present novel methods for Trojan protection 
and detection on field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) without the need for golden chips. Presented methods work at runtime 
instead of test time. We provide a wide spectrum of Trojan detection and protection methods. While the simplest methods have low 
overhead and provide limited protection mechanisms, more sophisticated and costly techniques are introduced that can detect 
hardware Trojans and even clean up the system from infected IPs. Moreover, we study the cost of using the FPGA partial 
reconfiguration feature to get rid of infected IPs. In addition, we discuss the possibility to construct IP core certificate authority that 
maintains a centralized database of unsafe vendors and IPs. We show the practicality of the introduced schemes by implementing the 
different methodologies on FPGAs. Results show that simple methods present negligible overheads and as we try to increase security 
the delay and power overheads increase. 
 
Keywords: Hardware Trojan; partial reconfiguration; hardware security; Trojan triggering.
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a dramatic shift from the vertical integrated 
silicon industry business to the horizontal one due to the 
rising cost of preserving manufacturing facilities, the 
increase in the competition, and the desire to have shorter 
time to market. Most design houses are currently fabless 
and tend to manufacture their designs in offshore 
facilities. Furthermore, designs are now complex so 
designers tend to embed some parts of the design by third 
party IPs. However, using third party IPs in the design 
industry raises many trust issues. The details of third party 
IPs are hidden and the fabrication process is obscured 
from the designer to protect the IP owner's rights. 
Designers need to ensure that no malicious circuitry is 
embedded in their designs by third party IP owners. 
With the widespread use of silicon chips in different 
applications, varying from cell phones, cars, to 
strategically important military devices; it is vital to 
provide methods that resolve the trust issues between 
fabrication facilities, designers, and end-users. One of the 
most important problems to resolve is hardware Trojan 
horse malware (malicious altering of hardware 
specification or implementation, denoted as Trojan 
thereafter) circuit protection and detection. Designers 
need to have guarantees that their designs are not 
tampered with while maintaining technology secrets of 
the fabrication facilities and design royalties of third party 
IP owners. End-users need to get guarantees that their 
devices are not controlled by unknown entities and/or will 
not leak sensitive information about them. 
Hardware Trojan detection methods have been 
developed to ensure that no malicious circuitry is 
embedded in their designs. These methods either try to 
introduce architectural modifications to prevent 
embedding Trojan [1, 2, 3, 4], or try to detect the 
existence of a Trojan with a high probability by studying 
side-channel waveforms [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. However, these 
methods mainly depend on comparing the untrusted chip 
with a trusted golden one. In practice, there is no golden 
http://dx.doi.org/10.12785/ijcds/050302 
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chip for third party IPs. Attempts were introduced to 
depend on the system integrator's design specifications for 
comparisons [11]. 
This paper develops novel methods for Hardware 
Trojan protection and detection. We introduce four 
methods that provide different levels of protection. Fig. 1 
shows the taxonomy of the introduced schemes for 
dynamic FPGA system protection and detection of 
Trojans. We can divide the presented work into methods 
for simple protection and methods for both detection and 
protection. Simple protection methods include: (1) simple 
blockage (SB) and (2) multiplexing reconfigurable 
variants’ outputs (MRVO). The dynamic protection and 
detection methods are: (1) multiplexing reconfigurable 
IPs’ outputs and cyclic redundancy check (CRC) Trojan 
detection schema (MCRC) and (2) multiple variants 
implementation (MV). 
 
The SB method works by obfuscating the output of 
suspected IPs and deobfuscating it only at the input of the 
receiving IPs. SB introduces low overhead. However, the 
protection it provides is limited. It can only protect from 
spying Trojans by hiding the information transmitted by 
the suspected IP. However, it will not really detect a 
Trojan or protect the circuit from failure. The MRVO 
method decreases the probability of circuit malfunction 
due to a Trojan attack by increasing the redundancy in the 
circuit by switching the operation of the circuit between at 
least two different implementations of the same IP. The 
MCRC method deals with infected Trojan by decreasing 
its probability to leak important information until 
detecting the infected IP and totally removing it by using 
the partial reconfiguration technique. The MV method 
introduces redundancy by using an odd number (at least 
three) of the same IP from different owners and voting 
according to the output. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
summarizes the related work. The protection against 
Trojan is described in Section 3, which consists of two 
subsections: 1) the implementation of the SB method and 
2) the implementation of the MRVO method. Then, 
Trojan detection methodologies are described in Section 
4, which consists of two subsections: 1) MCRC and 2) 
MV. We show CRC logger for safe use of third party IPs 
in Section 5. We introduce an authority to build a trusted 
IP market in Section 6. Experimental evaluation and 
estimation of the overhead of the methods are shown in 
Section 8. Finally, Section 9 concludes our work and 
presents future work directions. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Hardware Trojans are the malicious changing of 
hardware specification or implementation in a way that 
affects its functionality. Hardware Trojans are more 
dangerous than software Trojans because they reside at 
the lowest level of information processing and will 
continue to threaten the system as long as the infected 
hardware is in use. 
One way to ensure that the presence of Hardware 
Trojans cannot affect a design is by preventing them from 
subverting the functionality of an IC. The ability to create 
trusted circuits is proposed by Potkonjak [12]. Proposed 
solution fully accounts for the use of all hardware 
resources at all times. Waksman and Sethumadhavan 
introduced a method that attempts to prevent Trojan 
triggering [13]. Beaumont et al. ran replica of a program 
on multiple processing elements to achieve protection 
from hardware Trojans [14]. Baumgarten et al. used 
reconfigurable logic barriers within a design to prevent 
the activation and operation of hardware Trojans added 
during the IC manufacturing stage [15]. Ibn Ziad et al. 
provided a protection technique and showed its overhead 
against the injection of hardware Trojans in a voting 
machine to tamper voting results [16]. The attack depends 
mainly on the unused bits. The power overhead was 
negligible while the delay overhead did not exceed 10%. 
Hardware Trojan circuits are usually designed to be 
activated using a rare trigger. As a result, regular testing 
methods are not suitable to detect Trojans because they 
are not expected to be activated during testing. Recently, 
different methods have been specifically designed 
considering Trojan detection. We can classify these 
hardware Trojan detection methodologies into: (1) side-
channel dependent methodologies and (2) architectural 
methodologies [17]. 
Trojan impact is localized by side channel-dependent 
methodologies. The main idea is to try to detect the 
presence of a Trojan with a high probability by detecting 
the overload of the malicious circuit on different circuit 
parameters; such as the critical path delay or the power 
consumed as compared to a Trojan-free circuit. Wang et 
al. depend on localized current analysis for Trojan 
detection. They analyze power from multiple ports to 
detect the impact of the existence of Trojan on power 
 
Figure 1: Taxonomy of FPGA Trojan detection and protection 
schemes. 
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[18]. Rad et al. studied the impact of a Trojan on the 
power supply transient current of an IC using statistical 
methods [2]. Jin and Makris used critical path delay 
analysis to detect Trojans [8]. Banga et al. introduced a 
test vector generation method that can be used to 
differentiate between the side-channel waveforms of a 
Trojan-free and Trojan-inserted circuit [5, 6]. Gate-level 
characterization techniques accompanied by statistical 
methods are also used to detect hardware Trojans. These 
methods depend on gate-level power or delay 
characterization, or both [9, 10, 19, 20]. 
Architectural methodologies try to increase the 
opportunities of the activation of a hardware Trojan 
during testing. Salmani et al. increase the Trojan activity 
by inserting dummy flip flops in the design [4]. They 
chose locations of inserted flip flops based on a transition 
probability threshold. Banga and Hsiao used voltage 
inversion at alternating levels of the circuit to increase the 
power consumption of a Trojan-inserted circuit [1]. 
Rajendran et al. introduced a methodology for securing all 
the gates of a design using ring oscillators [3]. They added 
extra logic to convert paths of the circuit into ring 
oscillators. The presence of a Trojan is detected by the 
changes it causes in the frequency of the ring oscillators. 
All above methods have a critical problem. They 
require a golden chip. This problem can be degraded if the 
design does not contain third party IPs [21]. However, if a 
system designer integrates third party IPs in the design, 
these methods become impractical. Zhang and 
Tehranipoor tried to provide an alternative to using a 
golden design by using code coverage analysis, formal 
verification, and Automatic Test Pattern Generation 
(ATPG) methods to achieve high confidence in whether 
the circuit is Trojan-free or Trojan-inserted [11]. 
3. SIMPLE PROTECTION AGAINST TROJAN METHODS 
In this section, we show methods to protect from 
embedded Trojans without trying to detect them. 
Sometimes, designers cannot afford the cost of detecting 
Trojans. Hence, preventing sensitive information leakage 
without detecting the embedded Trojans becomes a 
designer target. We will introduce two simple methods: 
SB of Trojan outputs and MRVO. 
A. Simple Blockage (SB) of Trojan Outputs 
In the SB of Trojan outputs method, we try to provide 
protection by obfuscating the outputs of the untrusted IP 
before sending out data then undoing that obfuscation at 
the input of the receiver as shown in Fig. 2. This 
methodology is used to avoid revealing secret data 
through off-chip transmission [22]. 
Adhoc lightweight obfuscation functions can be used 
to achieve the target with low overhead. The inverse of 
the function needs to be used to retrieve original data at 
the receiver design part (Fig. 2). We suggest a simple 
function which is mainly based on data Xoring and 
Xnoring. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 describe our simple obfuscation 
function and its inverse, respectively. Processing will be 
done on every 2 bits by Xoring or Xnoring them and 
moving one bit value to another. As shown in Fig. 3, the 
original data contains bits A and B, which will be Xored 
to give C. Then, B will be shifted to A's place. Function 
inverse is shown in Fig. 4, where B and C are Xored to 
retrieve A. Then, B is shifted back to its original place. 
The same will be done for the third and forth bits, but with 
Xnoring. If original data size is odd, the last bit can be 
permuted with one of the other bits at the end. Section 8 
will show the obfuscation function overhead in details. 
We propose also to partially reconfigure an FPGA to 
replace the confusion function with another one 
periodically. This continuous update of the obfuscation 
function should make it difficult for the attacker to reveal 
the data. 
 
 
B. Multiplexing Reconfigurable Variants Outputs 
(MRVO) 
In the MRVO method, we try to increase the defense 
against Trojan attacks by reducing the probability of both 
leakage of sensitive information and malfunction due to a 
Trojan attack. We attempt to do this by using two or more 
untrusted implementations of the same IP from different 
untrusted vendors. Thus, the actual output of the system 
will be a mixture of the output from all different IP copies 
used in the system [23]. 
 
Figure 2: Using confusion circuits to protect a design against 
Trojan. 
 
Figure 3: A sample of a confusion function to protect secret data. 
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The main idea in case of not having a fully trusted IP 
is to use m copies of the IP from different untrusted 
vendors. At runtime, the output is randomly chosen from 
one of the m IPs. Thus, a Trojan will only impact the 
output if it is activated while the infected IP output is 
selected. 
Furthermore, we suggest to partial reconfigure an 
FPGA to replace current running IPs periodically or even 
randomly to decrease the ability of system hacking. Fig. 5 
illustrates the proposed idea. IP replacement takes about 
8% of the time required to program the whole design on 
the FPGA, as will be explained in Section 8. 
We propose the following criteria to select the output 
from different IPs. 
1) Unbiased Random Selection 
We use an unbiased random variable generator to 
select the output from one of the IPs. By this way, the 
probability of choosing an IP is equal among all the 
candidates. This methodology can be used if the design 
does not support the calculation of infection probability. 
2) Biased Random Selection 
We give a weighted voting among the available IPs 
that are used to choose output. Weights are inversely 
proportional to the probability of IP infection. Weights 
can be assigned using one of the following methods. 
 Tracking IPs behaviors can be implemented to 
assign a suitable weight to each IP. The result of 
comparing the output of the running IPs on 
runtime can be used to assign weights. Also, the 
CRC of the IPs outputs can be used as a good 
candidate to build the learning curve and assign 
weights, as will be shown in Subsection 4.A. 
 Weights can be assigned using the core 
certificate, which is proposed in Section 6. 
 
4. TROJAN DETECTION METHODS 
In this section, we show two Trojan detection 
methods: MCRC and MV and a scenario to remove 
infected IPs during runtime. 
A. Multiplexing Reconfigurable IPs' Outputs and CRC 
Trojan Detection Schema (MCRC) 
In this methodology, we multiplex m IPs output to 
select non infected-data. Our enhancement aims not only 
to decrease the probability of leaking sensitive 
information, but also to mark the IP as infected and its 
vendor as an attacker [24]. We introduce voting among 
IPs' CRCs to choose the major CRC, i.e., the CRC for the 
non infected-data. As shown in Fig. 6, the CRC voting 
circuit will be responsible for that job. Furthermore, the 
CRC voting circuit will keep track of the count of data 
errors for each IP producing infected output. If this count 
exceeds a certain threshold, the IP will be marked as an 
infected one and an alarm circuit will trigger a warning. 
We provide a small warning threshold for IPs that show 
discrepancies for the first time as this might be a design 
bug not a Trojan. However, this warning increases to 
include more actions when more faults are detected. The 
CRC voting circuit is shown in Fig. 7. It is worthy to 
mention that we can compare IPs outputs data instead of 
comparing their CRC. But, comparing IPs outputs will 
cost more area, power, and delay overheads as number of 
CRC output bits are much smaller in size than IPs'. This 
method will be very useful in building the core certificate 
authority, which will be in introduced in Section 6. 
1) Multiplexing Reconfigurable IPs' 
To further decrease the probability of information loss, 
we suggest using the FPGA partial reconfiguration (PR) 
feature which divides FPGA logic design into two 
different types: reconfigurable logic and static logic. 
Partial reconfiguration allows modifying reconfigurable 
regions in the FPGA without compromising the integrity 
 
Figure 4: Inverse of the sample of the confusion function in 
Fig. 3 to be used to retrieve original data. 
 
Figure 5: Multiplexing IP's outputs to reduce Trojan effect. 
IP1 to IPm can be replaced by IPi to IPii. 
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of the applications running on the static logic part, as 
illustrated in Fig. 8. In our methodology each IP core 
reserves a reconfigurable logic region, whereas the 
dynamic Trojan detector unit and the Trojan alarm 
handling unit will reserve a static logic region. 
 
 
 
By using the FPGA PR feature, we enhance the 
multiplexing idea to provide more secure designs on 
FPGA. Each IP core will reserve a reconfigurable logic 
region, whereas the multiplexer or even the CRC voting 
circuit will reserve a static logic region. In order to 
decrease the chance of sending secret information, we 
suggest to partial reconfigure the FPGA to replace the 
current running IP with a new IP periodically. We will 
need a queue of IPs to let some of them run currently and 
others wait their turns in the queue. 
Algorithm 1 describes the method of multiplexing 
reconfigurable IPs outputs for third party cores used on 
FPGA. The system designer keeps m implementations of 
the suspected core from different vendors. The FPGA is 
configured only using 3 cores (for example), multiplexer, 
and CRC voting circuit. The system runs normally and the 
output is taken by multiplexing outputs of the different 
variants. Once the CRC voting circuit detects an error in 
an IP, its error count will be incremented. If it exceeds the 
chosen threshold, it will be marked as an infected IP and 
replaced with a new core. Anomalous core whose error 
count exceeds the threshold will be removed from the 
system using PR. 
After a certain periodic time, we replace one of the 
three cores with the first IP on the waiting queue. 
Furthermore, the CRC results can be used to update the IP 
weights in the multiplexing process [24]. 
 
Algorithm 1: Multiplexing reconfigurable IPs’ outputs 
and CRC Trojan detection schema. 
1: Download 3 variant cores; 
2: Run system normally; 
3: i = 0; 
4: while running normally do 
5:  if CRC error then 
6:   increment IP error counter; 
7:   if IP error counter exceeds threshold then 
8: 
   partial reconfigure FPGA to remove 
the infected IP totally; 
9: 
   replace the infected IP with the first 
IP on the queue; 
10: 
   mark the anomalous core as an 
infected core; 
11:   end if 
12:  end if 
13:  if periodic time elapsed then 
14: 
  use partial configuration to replace IP 
number i with the first IP on the queue; 
15:   i = (i+1) mod 3; 
16:  end if 
17: end while 
B. Multiple Variant Implementation (MV) 
In this subsection, we show how to provide superior 
protection from hardware Trojans by using multiple 
variant implementations of suspected IPs. We propose 
adding multiple copies of the IP cores from different 
vendors and using the dynamic Trojan detector circuit to 
determine the suspected IP and the safe output using a 
majority voting circuit. Fig. 9 shows how the scheme 
works. We compare the output of m cores and if there is a 
mismatch between the different outputs, we suspect that 
there is a Trojan. If we have three or more IPs, we can use 
a voting circuit that chooses the correct output and raises a 
Trojan alarm, if needed [24]. 
 
Figure 6: Multiplexing reconfigurable IPs’ outputs to select a 
correct one and adding the CRC part to check output. 
 
Figure 7: CRC voting circuit. Error count indicates number of 
times the CRC of each IP is faulty. 
 
Figure 8: FPGA partial reconfiguration concept. 
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The Trojan alarm handling unit can partially 
reconfigure the FPGA to remove the infected core and 
replace it with a new one while the rest of the FPGA logic 
is still running. The dynamic Trojan detector unit will also 
mark the anomalous core vendor as a suspected vendor. 
The system designer keeps m different 
implementations of the suspected core from different 
vendors. The FPGA is configured only using 3 cores (for 
example) and the Trojan Alarm circuit. The system runs 
normally and the output is taken by majority voting from 
the different variants. Once a Trojan alarm occurs, the 
anomalous core is declared. The core is replaced by 
another unsuspected core. We note that we will raise the 
Trojan alarm if IP error counter exceeds a suitable 
threshold to distinguish between a bug and a Trojan.  
5. ATTACHING CRC LOGGER 
In this section, we suggest to attach a CRC logger to 
the third party IP in the critical system, as shown in Fig. 
10. CRC logger circuit must not come from a third party, 
as it might itself be infected. The CRC logger will 
basically compute the CRC for the IP inputs and outputs 
and store resulta in a memory, as shown in Fig. 11. Data 
stored in the memory can be extracted for comparison 
with actual IP specifications. The CRC logger can be 
enabled at critical times or randomly to track an IP 
behavior. We choose to us CRC outputs instead of actual 
inputs and outputs to decrease number of processed bits. 
CRC could capture 99.95% of transmission errors [25]. If 
a single bit is incorrect, the CRC value will not match up. 
We should highlight that data encoding can be used for 
further reduction in number of processed bits. 
6. BUILDING A TRUSTED IP MARKET 
As we have a lot of cores and vendors, we suggest 
establishing a core certificate authority, which will take 
the responsibility of handling the blacklist database. Any 
vendor who wants to have such a certificate has to contact 
the cores certificate authority. This authority will evaluate 
cores using the MV method. If a core is infected, the 
authority marks it as a spyware-infected core and the 
vendor has to prove to the authority that it is only a bug 
not a Trojan infection and can update it with a fixed 
version. Refer to Fig. 12 as an example on authority 
database. A core is labeled as safe if the warning score is 
zero, as buggy if the warning score is less than a 
threshold, and as infected otherwise. IP users can also 
give feedback about detected faults and thus indirectly 
share in updating database. This arrangement will help a 
designer to buy an IP from a vendor with a good 
reputation. This authority should be able to afford high 
cost hardware Trojan detection methodologies. 
 
 
 
Since it is difficult that one user detects the Trojan on 
his/her own. So, our main idea is to have a centralized 
database to maintain the information and reinforce it. The 
certificate authority is responsible for maintaining the 
database and verifying the findings. However, users 
should collaborate and report discovered Trojans when a 
Trojan is caught. Each suspicious IP should be reported 
with the input vector at which the suspicious output 
occurred. The authority can also conduct its tests. 
However, a collaborative construction of the database is 
much more valuable due to the rare trigger of a Trojan. 
We suggest certifying the safety of third party core 
usage by using the MV concept. We developed an 
automated system to build and update core certificate 
 
Figure 9: Using multiple variants of the same IP to catch Trojan. 
 
Figure 10: Attaching CRC logger to a third party IP to detect 
Trojan. 
 
Figure 11: CRC-logger role: compute CRC and store result in 
memory. 
 
Figure 12: A core certificate authority database example. 
  
 Int. J. Com. Dig. Sys. 5, No.3, 211-223 (May-2016)                        217 
 
 
http://journals.uob.edu.bh 
authority database for different cores and vendors, as 
shown in Fig. 13. Customers will submit their copies of 
the IP core from different vendors. Then, a Trojan 
detector circuit determines the suspected IP and the safe 
output using a majority voting among candidates. The 
circuit compares the output of m cores and whether there 
is a mismatch between the different outputs. Furthermore, 
it keeps track of the number of errors for the different 
cores. If such number exceeds the chosen threshold, a 
Trojan alarm will be raised to update the cores and vendor 
database. Infected IPs will be marked as Trojan-infected 
IP. Then, the server will partial reconfigure the FPGA to 
replace the Trojan-infected IP with a new one while the 
rest of the FPGA logic is still running. After a certain 
period, IP counters will be submitted to the server to 
determine safe and buggy IPs. Algorithm 2 describes the 
core authority automated system algorithm for third party 
cores. In our methodology each IP core reserves a 
reconfigurable logic region, whereas the Trojan detector 
unit reserves a static logic region. 
 
Algorithm 2: Core certificate authority automated 
system algorithm. 
1: Download m variant cores; 
2: Run system normally; 
3: while time does not exceed time period T do 
4: 
 compare IPs outputs and choose a major one 
using majority vote. 
5:  if one IP output is different from others then 
6:   increment IP error counter 
7: 
  if IP error counter exceeds the threshold 
then 
8:    raise Trojan alarm; 
9:    use PR to replace infected core; 
10: 
   mark the anomalous core as a 
Trojan-infected core in the database; 
11:   end if 
12:  end if 
13: end while 
14: 
Update server with current IPs error counters to 
update database with buggy and safe IPs 
7. ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES 
In this section, we describe some of the possible 
Trojan attacks and their countermeasures using our 
proposed methodologies. 
A. Internally-triggered Trojan to Leak Sensitive 
Information 
The Trojan circuit in Fig. 14 sends the result of 
XORing the pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) 
output sequence with the secret information bits. The 
attacker knows about the exact setup of the code 
generator, which is required to predict the code sequence. 
So, the attacker can easily XOR the transmitted data again 
to get the secret key. Lin and Kasper introduced Trojan 
for ASIC, which sends information wireless through a 
separate leakage circuit [26]. However, we assume Trojan 
for an FPGA with a simple modification by sending the 
Trojan output multiplexed with current encrypted data 
output in the same clock encryption period or simply 
using unused bits in network packets. We classify this 
Trojan as an internally triggered Trojan. 
 
Proposed SB can deal perfectly with the internally-
triggered Trojan as sensitive information will be well-
encrypted. The MV method will choose the majority 
output and thus an infected IP can be detected. On the 
other hand, multiplexing IPs' outputs will try to decrease 
the probability of losing information. However, an 
attacker can predict his/her IP turn due to using pseudo-
random generator and sends the information bits 
distributed on multiple turns. CRC enhancement will try 
to solve this issue by detecting the infected IP and 
removing it. However, some parts of the sensitive 
information maybe lost before Trojan detection. 
The main advantage of the SB method is that it works 
regardless of the source of the trigger. The method 
proposed by Waksman and Sethumadhavan in [13] cannot 
deal with the internally-triggered Trojan as it depends on 
preventing external triggers. Moreover, they added special 
hardware for each Trojan activation method so more 
methods will need more hardware. 
If the third party IP is within a network and the Trojan 
aims to leak network information, we suggest using SB to 
obfuscate data of all third party IP output lines to prevent 
data leakage and then do deobfuscation at trusted IPs 
inputs, as shown in Fig. 15. 
 
Figure 13: Automated system to build and update core certificate 
authority database. 
 
Figure 14: Hardware Trojan to leak secret key. 
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B. Externally-triggered Trojan to Leak Sensitive 
Information 
The discussion in this subsection is similar to the case 
of an internally-triggered Trojan as we do not depend on 
preventing triggering the Trojan. Waksman and 
Sethumadhavan in [13] can only deal with a specific set of 
Trojan triggers. However, our methods work for any 
trigger type as we do not try to stop the trigger, but rather 
try to stop the impact of an activated Trojan. 
If we analyze more the MCRC schema, we find that 
there is a period (T) before the detection of the infected 
IP. System output during this period is shared between all 
used IPs. If we assume a fair IP multiplexing, we will find 
that the attacker IP will have a (T/number of IPs) period to 
leak sensitive information. On the other hand, the MV 
schema will not allow any period to the attacker, as it will 
choose the major IPs' output during the running time. We 
may remark the former argument as an advantage for MV 
over MCRC. It will provide higher level of protection 
when addressing leaking information and disturbing 
functionality Trojans. Nevertheless, we find that MCRC 
can get rid of injected Trojan. So, we must highlight that 
as an advantage for MCRC over MRVO. 
C. Trojan to Disrupt Functionality 
SB cannot help with disrupting functionality Trojan. 
MRVO will decrease the Trojan effect only. Interestingly, 
the higher the number of variants (m), the lower the 
Trojan effect. But, unfortunately higher m imposes higher 
cost. MCRC and MV will detect the infected Trojan and 
remove it from the system perfectly. However, CRC 
enhancement may result in function disruption before 
Trojan detection. 
D. Timing and Power Side Channel Attacks 
Timing and power side channel attacks can happen 
with SB. However, other methodologies can resist these 
attacks as the system contains multiple implementations 
and other supplementary circuits and therefore will absorb 
both timing and power side channels. We summarize 
these information in Table I. Each methodology has a 
score against each attack. A score of 0 means the method 
cannot protect against the attack. Scores of 1, 2, and 3 
refer to low, moderate, and strong protection against the 
attack, respectively. Method overall score is obtained by 
summing the attack scores, then scaling to be out of 3. It 
can be seen that MCRC and MV provide the highest two 
overall scores and are expected to introduce the largest 
overheads (as will be show in Section 8). 
TABLE I.  TROJANS AND PROPOSED METHODS EVALUATION 
AGAINST ATTACKS. 
Trojan type SB MRVO MCRC MV 
Externally-triggered 3 1 2 3 
Internally-triggered 3 1 2 3 
Leaking information 3 1 2 3 
Disturbing functionality 0 1 2 3 
Power/timing side channel 0 3 3 3 
Method overall score 1.8 1.4 2.2 3 
8. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this section, we study the effect of using the 
proposed methods on consumed power, number of used 
look-up tables (LUTs), and critical path delay. We will 
describe in details the used benchmarks and study the 
overhead of each method. First, we will study the 
overheads of using protection from Trojan. Then, we will 
concentrate on Trojan detection schemes. 
A. Protection Against Trojan 
In this subsection, we study the power, area, and delay 
overheads of using SB and MRVO. 
1) SB Overhead 
The six OpenCores benchmarks listed in Table II are 
used to study the SB method [27]. 
TABLE II.  DESCRIPTION OF USED BENCHMARKS (BENCHMARKS 
ARE SELECTED FROM OPENCORES [27]). 
Benchmark Description 
FHT 
Fast Hadamhard Transform (FHT) of 8-bit input data 
using matrix addition. 
PID 
Digital proportional–integral–derivative (PID) 
controller. 
F3M Y3 mod (x97 + x12 +2), where Y is a 194-bit input port. 
FPU A set of floating point operations. 
CA PRNG 
1-D binary cellular automata with wrap around at the 
edges, i.e., a ring. 
Solomon 
Reed Solomon Decoder with a 204-byte and 188-
byte input and output codeword lengths, respectively. 
We implemented the selected six benchmarks on 
Xilinx Virtex 6 FPGAs and used Xilinx ISE Design Suite 
v14 1 to evaluate the experimental results. We used an 
xc6vcx75tff484-1 FPGA device for all the benchmarks, 
except the FPU one for which we used an 
xc6vcx130tff1156-1 device, as it needs more FPGA 
resources. Also, power is calculated using a 100 MHz 
clock, except for FPU for which a 10 MHz clock rate was 
used due to the 99.495 ns minimum allowed clock period. 
After running synthesis, we got the number of used 
LUTs (from the synthesis XST report), the critical path 
delay (from the synthesis timing report), and consumed 
power (using Xilinx Xpower Analyzer). Summary of 
results obtained before adding the SB method is shown in 
Table III. 
 
Figure 15: Suspected third party IP within a network. 
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TABLE III.  DETAILS FROM THE HARDWARE IMPLMENTATION OF 
THE BENCHMARKS IN TABLE II BEFORE ADDING THE SB METHOD. 
Benchmark Used LUTs 
Delay 
(ns) 
Consumed power 
(mW) 
FHT 26 1.720 1.300 
PID 1345 3.938 1.321 
F3M 144 1.297 2.350 
FPU 9591 99.495 1.327 
CA PRNG 105 1.824 1.343 
Solomon 4954 4.479 1.386 
We used the obfuscating function described in 
Subsection 3.A to protect benchmarks outputs from a 
Trojan embedded in a third party IP. Table IV summarizes 
the results after integrating the obfuscating function. If we 
compare Table III and Table IV, we find an average 
increase of 12.74% in used LUTs. We also find using our 
obfuscating function with F3M introduces more delay 
than other benchmarks as the size of its output port is 194 
bits, so it needs more processing time. Finally, we 
conclude that the average increase in critical path delay is 
2.309% and the average increase in consumed power is 
0.766% in our benchmarks. 
TABLE IV.  SIMPLE OBFUSCATION FUNCTION RESULTS. 
Benchmark 
Percentage of 
increase in 
Used LUTs 
Percentage of 
increase in 
delay 
Percentage of 
increase in 
consumer power 
FHT 0.46 0.520 0.846 
PID 3.79 0.001 0.529 
F3M 39.58 12.950 1.957 
FPU 0.84 0.001 0.075 
CA PRNG 31.43 0.380 1.116 
Solomon 0.34 0.001 0.072 
Average 12.74 2.309 0.766 
2) MRVO Overhead 
In this subsection, we study the effect of the MRVO 
method on the number of used LUTs, power, and PR time 
and evaluate the third party authority system cost. 
ZedBoard Zynq Evaluation and Development Kit 
(xc7z020clg484-1) was used in this experiment as it 
supports PR. In experiments requiring multiple 
implementations of the same IP, we use an ALU 
(logic_unit) core and a serial transmitter unit (RS_TX) 
core. For each core, we get multiple implementations 
from different vendors to study the overhead of using 
multiple cores of used IPs. 
We selected two different implementations of each IP 
and integrated them with the multiplexing circuit to 
construct the full system. Table V summarizes 
implementation details of the used RS_TX IPs without 
using PR. We note here that the reported consumed power 
does not include the ZedBoard leakage power. 
TABLE V.  DETAILS FROM THE HARDWARE IMPLMENTATION OF 
THE USED RS_TX CORES WITHOUT USING PR. 
  Used LUTs 
Consumed power 
(mW) 
RS_TX_n1 18 0.70 
RS_TX_n2 24 0.78 
RS_TX_n3 30 0.85 
We investigate the effect of using the PR on the 
consumed power and the number of used LUTs. Table VI 
shows the percentage increase in number of LUTs and the 
percentage increase in the consumed power when we set a 
reconfigurable area for each IP. RS_TX_1PR_n1 indicates 
using one reconfigurable area only for RS_TX_n1. The 
table shows that using a reconfigurable area increases the 
required LUTs. If we compare results of both Table V and 
Table VI, we will observe the overhead of using PR on a 
single programmed IP only. The average increase in 
number of LUTs is 31.53% and the average increase in 
consumed power is 1.2733%. 
TABLE VI.  DETAILS FROM THE HARDWARE IMPLMENTATION OF 
THE USED RS_TX CORES WHEN USING PR. 
  
Percentage of 
increase in Used 
LUTs 
Percentage of 
increase in 
consumer power 
RS_TX_1PR_n1 55.56 1.2500 
RS_TX_1PR_n2 27.27 1.3800 
RS_TX_1PR_n3 11.76 1.1900 
Average 31.53 1.2733 
Then, we investigate the effect of multiplexing two 
IPs without PR. Table VII illustrates the variant number 
of LUTs and consumed power if we use every two IPs in 
the same design with multiplexer and no PR. RS_TX-
T_n1n2 indicates the combination of RS_TX_n1 and 
RS_TX_n2. If we compare results in Table V and Table 
VII, we see an increase in the allocated area which is 
expected due to loading two designs on the FPGA. This 
increase is proportional to the size of the two selected IPs. 
TABLE VII.  DETAILS FROM THE HARDWARE IMPLMENTATION OF 
MULTIPLEXING TWO RS_TX CORES WITHOUT USING PR. 
 
Used LUTs 
Consumed power 
(mW) 
RS_TX_n1n2 48 1.22 
RS_TX_n1n3 53 1.25 
RS_TX_n2n3 57 1.35 
Furthermore, we investigate the effect of multiplexing 
two RS_TX IPs in case of reserving reconfigurable area 
for each IP. Table VIII shows the number of LUTs, 
consumed power, and switching time when we set two 
reconfigurable areas in which IPs can be replaced by each 
other. RS_TX_2PR_n1n2 indicates using RS_TX_n1 and 
RS_TX_n2 at the same time, each in an individual 
reconfigurable area. Results in Table VIII indicate that 
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using two reconfigurable areas increases the required 
LUTs. Moreover, if two empty black box modules 
(RS_TX-2PR_BB) are loaded, we will also need a 
number of LUTs which is larger than what is required by 
one reconfigurable area (12 LUTs and 1.01 mW for one 
reconfigurable area). If we compare results in Table VII 
and Table VIII, we find that using two reconfigurable 
areas with PR need more LUTs than mixing two IPs 
without PR. However, in PR these two modules can be 
easily replaced by m modules. 
TABLE VIII.  DETAILS FROM THE HARDWARE IMPLMENTATION OF 
MULTIPLEXING TWO RS_TX CORES WHEN USING PR. 
  Used LUTs 
Consumed power 
(mW) 
RS_TX-2PR_n1n2 65 1.94 
RS_TX-2PR_n1n3 64 1.83 
RS_TX-2PR_n2n3 75 1.96 
RS_TX-2PR_BB 25 1.26 
Since PR switches between IPs, we found that the time 
elapsed to replace one design with another ranges from 
400 to 500 msec, with an average of 450 msec. While the 
time used to program the whole design ranges from 5 to 6 
sec. As a result, we notice that PR succeeds in replacing 
designs at a negligible time compared to the time required 
to program the whole design. 
We repeat the former experiments, but using ALU IPs 
from different vendors. Table IX reports the number of 
LUTs and consumed power if we use every IP alone. In 
the table, logic_unit_n1 indicates the first ALU IP. 
TABLE IX.  DETAILS FROM THE HARDWARE IMPLMENTATION OF 
THE USED ALU CORES WITHOUT USING PR. 
 
Used LUTs 
Consumed power 
(mW) 
logic_unit_n1 7 0.15 
logic_unit_n2 9 0.21 
logic_unit_n3 4 0.12 
Table X shows the number of LUTs and consumed 
power in case of multiplexing two ALUs without PR. 
logic_unit_n1n2 indicates combination of the first and the 
second implementations of the logic unit core 
(logic_unit_n1 and logic_unit_n2). 
TABLE X.  DETAILS FROM THE HARDWARE IMPLMENTATION OF 
MULTIPLEXING TWO ALU CORES WITHOUT USING PR. 
  Used LUTs 
Consumed power 
(mW) 
logic_unit_n1n2 15 0.28 
logic_unit_n1n3 14 0.19 
logic_unit_n2n3 18 0.27 
 
Finally, Table XI reports the number of LUTs, 
consumed power, and switching time when we reserve 
reconfigurable area for each ALU IP. 
TABLE XI.  DETAILS FROM THE HARDWARE IMPLMENTATION OF 
MULTIPLEXING TWO ALU CORES WHEN USING PR. 
  Used LUTs 
Consumed power 
(mW) 
logic_unit-2PR_n1n2 43 0.45 
logic_unit-2PR_n1n3 38 0.36 
logic_unit-2PR_n2n3 40 0.42 
3) Different Selection Criteria 
In this subsection, we show the effect of using biased 
random selection of IPs on the number of used LUTs, 
critical path delay, and its accuracy. 
ZedBoard Zynq Evaluation and Development Kit 
(xc7z020clg484-1) was also used in this experiment. We 
used three different implementations of the RS_TX core 
to select from them. 
We study the percentage of selecting an infected IP 
using unbiased and biased selection. In our experiment, 
we use two non-infected IPs and an infected one. 
In one experiment, the Trojan in the infected IP is 
active during all clock cycles. In this experiment, if an 
infected IP is selected, the output will be infected. In 
another one, the Trojan is active at the odd cycles only. In 
this one, if an infected IP is selected, output may or may 
not be infected. 
In the biased selection, we give an 8-bit weight to each 
IP. Initially, all IPs have the same weight, which is half 
the maximum weight. While running, we increment 
weights of IPs with same output by one and decrement 
weights of odd IPs by one. We are limited in incrementing 
and decrementing by the number of bits of used weights. 
We ran the system for 1000 clock cycles and recorded 
the probability of selecting an infected IP and an infected 
output in Table XII. The table shows how the accuracy of 
selecting a correct IP and a correct output is improved in 
the biased selection. 
TABLE XII.  PROBABILITY OF SELECTING AN INFECTED IP AND AN 
INFECTED OUTPUT USING BIASED AND UNBIASED SELECTION. 
  
Probability of 
selecting an infected 
IP 
Probability of 
selecting an 
infected output 
Trojan of infected IP is active in all cycles 
Unbiased selection 30% 30% 
Biased selection 2% 2% 
Trojan of infected IP is active in odd cycles 
Unbiased selection 30% 15% 
Biased selection 20% 10% 
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Next, we show the overhead of using the biased 
selection. Table XIII shows the number of LUTs and 
critical path delay for the biased and unbiased selection. 
From the table, we conclude that using biased selection 
has an obvious overhead on number of LUTs, but it does 
not affect the critical path delay. 
TABLE XIII.  DETAILS FROM THE HARDWARE IMPLMENTATION OF 
THE BIASED AND UNBIASED SELECTION. 
  Used LUTs Delay (ns) 
Unbiased selection 57 3.273 
Biased selection 149 3.273 
B. Trojan Detection Schemes 
In this subsection, we study the overhead of the 
different Trojan detection schemes: MCRC and MV. 
1) MCRC Overhead 
We used three UART IPs as multiple variants. CRC 
computation is done on each UART output. We note that 
using CRC in this case may not be considered as a type of 
overhead as UART is usually used with CRC computation 
to detect sending errors. CRC truncated polynomial is 
x
5
+x
2
+1 and it is applied on each eight bits of the UART 
output. Table XIV summarizes the synthesis details using 
a Virtex 6 xc6vcx75tff484-1 device. 
TABLE XIV.  DETAILS FROM THE HARDWARE IMPLMENTATION OF 
THE MCRC METHOD ON THE UART CORES. 
  Used LUTs 
Delay 
(ns) 
Consumed power 
(mW) 
UART1 26 1.874 13 
UART2 28 1.657 6 
UART3 68 2.371 10 
FinalUART 179 2.651 107 
We repeat the experiment with the ALU IPs. Table 
XV summarizes the synthesis details using a Virtex 6 
xc6vcx75tff484-1 device. Leakage power equals 1.293 
mW and it is the same for all cases. 
TABLE XV.  DETAILS FROM THE HARDWARE IMPLMENTATION OF 
THE MCRC METHOD ON THE ALU CORES. 
  Used LUTs 
Delay 
(ns) 
Consumed power 
(mW) 
ALU1 48 12.220 2 
ALU2 36 4.623 13 
ALU3 169 3.767 50 
FinalALU 221 12.528 101 
2) MV Overhead 
We used three UART IPs as multiple variants and 
integrated them with the dynamic Trojan detector circuit 
to construct FinalUART. Table XVI shows the synthesis 
details using a Virtex 6 xc6vcx75tff484-1 device. 
We notice that the FinalUART delay equals the 
maximum delay of a UART core plus the delay of 
dynamic Trojan detector circuit. However, the latter delay 
in this experiment is less than 1 ps due to the low 
processing time of a 1-bit output. Leakage power equals 
1.293 mW and it is the same for all cases. 
TABLE XVI.  DETAILS FROM THE HARDWARE IMPLMENTATION OF 
THE MV METHOD ON THE UART CORES. 
  Used LUTs 
Delay 
(ns) 
Consumed power 
(mW) 
UART1 26 1.874 13 
UART2 28 1.657 6 
UART3 68 2.371 10 
FinalUART 123 2.371 22 
We repeat the former experiment, but using ALU IPs 
from different vendors. Table XVII shows the synthesis 
details using a Virtex 6 xc6vcx75tff484-1 device. 
We notice that the FinalALU delay equals the 
maximum delay of an ALU core plus the delay of 
dynamic Trojan detector circuit. The latter delay in this 
experiment equals 1.695 ns. Leakage power equals 1.293 
mW and it is the same for all cases. 
TABLE XVII.  DETAILS FROM THE HARDWARE IMPLMENTATION OF 
THE MV METHOD ON THE ALU CORES. 
  Used LUTs 
Delay 
(ns) 
Consumed power 
(mW) 
ALU1 48 12.220 2 
ALU2 36 4.623 13 
ALU3 169 3.767 50 
FinalALU 190 13.915 100 
We repeat the same experiment, but using AES IPs 
from different vendors. The AES core is a symmetric 
block cipher core that can process data blocks of 128 bits, 
using a 128-bit key. Table XVIII shows the synthesis 
details using a Virtex 6 xc6vlx550tff1760-1 device. 
We notice that the FinalAES delay equals the 
maximum delay of an AES core plus the delay of dynamic 
Trojan detector circuit. The latter delay in this experiment 
equals 0.214 ns. Leakage power equals 3.769 mW and it 
is the same for all cases. 
TABLE XVIII.  AES MULTIPLE VARIANT METHODOLOGIES RESULTS. 
  Used LUTs 
Delay 
(ns) 
Consumed power 
(mW) 
AES1 702 4.313 461 
AES2 1553 5.502 130 
AES3 256 2.972 419 
FinalAES 1153 5.716 1050 
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9. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We have introduced the first methodologies that work 
by embracing Trojans and protecting the system from 
them without trying to detect the Trojan during testing. 
Our methods operate at runtime instead of the traditional 
test-time techniques. This work targets protection from 
Trojans that could be embedded in third party IPs, where 
no golden design is available. We presented methods for 
simple system level protection and more sophisticated 
methods that are capable of detecting the Trojan and 
removing it from the system. The SB methodology was 
the first simple protection scheme introduced and worked 
by obfuscating the output of suspected IPs to hide any 
information leakage. The second simple protection 
method was the MRVO method that protects the system 
from both leaking sensitive information and malfunction. 
We also introduced two methods: MCRC and MV to 
dynamically remove Trojan-infected IPs and report 
Trojans. They take advantage of the PR feature of modern 
FPGAs to clean up infected IPs. 
We provided sample implementations of the different 
methodologies. In the SB methodology, the delay 
overhead was negligible, whereas the power overhead did 
not exceed 2%. Other methodologies provide higher 
overhead. However they provide superior security 
mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
work that attempts to do dynamic hardware Trojan 
detection and protection on FPGAs. 
We are looking forward to analyzing our protection 
and detection techniques on ASICs instead of FPGAs. 
Proposing hardware Trojans and attacking different 
systems should give a chance for better comparison 
between proposed schemas. We think about injecting 
hardware Trojans in one of IPs variants and compare MV 
and MCRC schemes. Comparing the strength of the 
proposed techniques from the point of view of 
probabilistic study of defense should be interesting also. 
We will try to put guidelines to determine the strength of 
any protection or detection technique. 
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